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1 Introduction
One of the more interesting cases of recent years has to be the Slovak Bears case.1 
This case dealt with the position of a Slovak environmental  non-governmental 
organisation (engo) in administrative proceedings in relation to requested 
derogations in the hunting and permitting law regarding the European Brown 
Bear. Due to the nature of the Slovak administrative law, the engo would only 
be awarded certain rights if it could get the qualification of ‘participant’ in the 
proceedings. When this status was denied, the engo was de facto barred from 
taking part in the discussion regarding the requested derogations, but equally 
would not be notified of developments; would not get access to documents, 
and would not be able to contest the outcome of the administrative process. 
The engo was denied the status of participant and contested this denial.
The case rose to prominence when the Slovakian Supreme Court sent a 
preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union (cjeu) 
which referenced the obligations of the Slovakian government under the Aar-
hus Convention.2 This international agreement, signed both by the Member 
States and the eu, is well known for being an innovative attempt to solve the 
problems faced by many individuals and ngos when trying to protect their 
living environment. It does so by committing its signatories to the securing 
and, where necessary, relaxing of the procedural rights of parties regarding 
1 Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie vlk v. Ministerstvo životného prostredia Sloven-
skej republiky eu:C:2011:115 (Slovak Bears).
2 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, “Convention on access to information, 
public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters” 
(available at <www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf>).
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The Slovak Bear case was of interest as it presented the Court with a case in 
which an international agreement interacted with European law in an area that 
has traditionally been regarded as off-limits for judicial intervention under the 
concept of ‘procedural autonomy’.3 One of the most cited articles on this case 
has therefore rightly been titled: “Who is the Referee?”.4 At the time of the Slo-
vak Bear case, the theoretical possibilities of the cjeu to enforce the Aarhus 
Convention, which itself has a more conciliatory compliance mechanism,5 
were of great interest not only to national engos but equally so to the academ-
ics studying the Court’s own approach to standing of public interest litigants. 
The facts surrounding the Slovak Bear case were enlivened by the fact that the 
Court itself does not have the best reputation when it comes to locus standi in 
non-economic cases.6 
Given the above, it is safe to say that the resolution of the Slovak Bear case 
has drawn a lot of attention.7 The Court of Justice did indeed find a way to 
3 For a discussion on whether or not this concept does even still exist, the following contribu-
tion by Bobek is highly recommended: ‘Why There Is No Principle of “Procedural Autonomy” 
of the Member States’, The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of Member States (In-
tersentia 2012).
4 Jan H Jans, ‘Who Is the Referee? Access to Justice in a Globalised Legal Order: A Case Analysis 
of ecj Judgment C-240/09 Lesoochranárske Zoskupenie of 8 March 2011’ (2011) 4 REALaw 85.
5 The Aarhus Convention makes use of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, a 
non-judicial body that aims to help signatories in attaining compliance with the Convention. 
See: Veit Koester, ‘The Compliance Committee of the Aarhus Convention, and Overview of 
Procedures and Jurisprudence’ (2007) 37 Environmental Policy and Law 83.
6 Jerzy Jendrośka, ‘Aarhus Convention and Community Law: The Interplay’ (2005) 2 Journal for 
European Environmental & Planning Law 12; Jan H Jans, ‘Did Baron von Munchhausen Ever 
Visit Aarhus? Some Critical Remarks on the Proposal for a Regulation on the Application of 
the Provisions of the Aarhus Convention to ec Institutions and Bodies’ <http://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=956602> accessed 19 March 2014; Marc Pallemaerts, The 
Aarhus Convention at Ten: Interactions and Tensions Between Conventional International Law 
and eu Environmental Law (Europa Law Publishing 2011); Ludwig Krämer, ‘The eu Courts 
and Access to Environmental Justice’, Environmental Law Dimensions of Human Rights (oup 
Oxford 2015).
7 B Muller, ‘Access to the Courts of the Member States for ngos in Environmental Matters 
under European Union Law: Judgment of the Court of 12 May 2011 – Case C-115/09 Trianel 
and Judgment of 8 March 2011 – Case C-240/09 Lesoochranarske Zoskupenie’ (2011) 23 J Envi-
ronmental Law 505; Mariolina Eliantonio, ‘Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske Zoskupenie vlk 
v. Ministerstvo Životného Prostredia Slovenskej Republiky, Judgment of the Court of Justice 
(Grand Chamber) of 8 March 2011, Nyr, and Case C-115/09, Bund Für Umwelt Und Natur-
schutz Deutschland, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen eV v. Bezirksregierung Arnsberg 
(Intervening Party: Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen GmbH & Co. kg) Judgment of the Court 
of Justice (Fourth Chamber) of 12 May 2011, Nyr.’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 767; 
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 enforce the Aarhus Convention by way of the Habitat Directive. This has been 
the point on which most of the subsequent discussion focussed. The Supreme 
Court of Slovakia in its reference, posed two relevant questions: Is it possible 
to recognise that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention has direct effect as it 
has become part of the acquis, but no legislative measures by the (then) Com-
munity have been undertaken?8 Is it possible to recognise Article 9(3) Aarhus 
Convention as having direct effect as Community law?9 The reasoning behind 
the questions points to the classical approach of the Court to international 
agreements. The Aarhus Convention is a Mixed Agreement on a shared compe-
tence.10 As such, both Member States and eu are bound to the obligations laid 
down in the Aarhus Convention. However, as environmental policy is a shared 
competence, the Member States are competent to regulate in this area as long 
as the eu has not undertaken any measures.11 By its questions, the Slovak Court 
is, in fact, asking the cjeu whether in its opinion Slovakia is free to set rules on 
access to justice, or whether an act of the Community precludes this. 
As the attempts by the Community to regulate access to justice in the 
Member States had failed,12 there was no immediate indication that Article 
9(3) Aarhus Convention fell under the auspices of the Community and the 
Court. However, the Court reasoned that in this case the procedure relates to 
the protection of a species that was explicitly placed on the list annexed to the 
Habitats Directive.13 As a consequence, the proceedings fell within the scope 
 Ludwig Krämer, ‘Comment on Case C-240/09 Lesoochranárske Zoskupenie vlk: Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters: New Perspectives (See Page 402)’ (2011) 8 Journal for 
European Environmental & Planning Law 445.
8 Article 9 Aarhus Convention aims to secure the right of access to justice for individuals 
and organisations that seek to protect the environment. There are three clauses in the 
article that aim to specify situations and applicants accordingly. As such, as will be demon-
strated, Article 9(2) Aarhus Convention deals with applicants seeking to secure their rights 
under Article 6 Aarhus Convention (right to participate in decision-making). Article 9(3) 
Aarhus Convention aims to secure a broader to access to justice, albeit with a greater mar-
gin of appreciation for signatories to embed the access to justice against acts and omis-
sions in contravention of provision of environmental law in the national legal system.
9 The third question goes to the effect of an affirmative answer in the two questions 
mentioned.
10 Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi, ‘eu Member State Enforcement of “Mixed” Agreements and Ac-
cess to Justice: Rethinking Direct Effect’ (2013) 40 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 
163.
11 Case C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland (mox Plant) eu:C:2006:345 para. 86 and further.
12 See com/2003/624/final “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on access to justice in environmental matters”.
13 Annex vi (a) as per para. 53 Case C-240/09.
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of  Community law. It furthermore reasoned that even though the proposal to 
regulate 9(3) Aarhus Convention had failed, and Regulation 1367/2006 only 
sought to implement the Convention for the Institutions,14 this signalled a 
broader commitment of the Community to the Aarhus Convention. Further-
more, under this broader commitment, far-reaching diverging opinions on the 
interpretation thereof are unwanted. The Court was, therefore, competent to 
rule on the direct applicability of Article 9(3) Aarhus Convention. It judged 
the wording of this article to be too broad to be directly applicable within the 
meaning given to that term by the case law. However, it did relate to the Slova-
kian Supreme Court that given the scope and meaning of the Convention and 
the obligation under the Habitat Directive to protect the Brown Bear, Article 
9(3) Aarhus Convention should be interpreted in such a way as to ensure effec-
tive judicial protection. The engo should as such be awarded the possibility 
to initiate proceedings. This brief summary of this complicated case illustrates 
why it became of such importance. The Court itself acknowledged that the 
Union had not undertaken any successful measures to implement Article 9(3) 
of the Aarhus Convention. Still, it took upon itself the task to assess whether 
this clause had an effect on the Member State’s legal order, even going so far as 
to give an interpretation of what that effect should be. This is all on the basis of 
the Habitats Directive and the broad commitment to the Aarhus Convention. 
The situation brings to mind on the one hand, he discussions on the applicabil-
ity of the Charter (when is there an application of eu law?)15 but on the other 
hand a strong sense of judicial activism if not an act ultra vires. As has been 
the case in other areas of law, it takes another case for the Court of Justice to 
further refine and illustrate its reasoning.16 The case under discussion, which 
interestingly deals with the same actors, is just that. Due in part to the phrasing 
of the question of the referring court, this new Slovakian case offered the Court 
a chance to take into account not only its previous judgment but also place its 
14 Regulation 1367/2006/ec on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention 
on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (Aarhus Regulation) oj 
L 264, 13.
15 See Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson eu:C:2013:105.
16 See for instance the Court’s case-law on Citizenship, which started with Case C-135/08 
Rottmann, escalated with Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, both of which now fit in the 
wider context of McCarthy and Dereci: Niamh Nic Shuibhne, ‘Case C-434/09, Shirley Mc-
Carthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Judgment of the Court of Justice 
(Third Chamber) of 5 May 2011; Case C-256/11, Dereci and Others v. Bundesministerium 
Fur Inneres, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 15 November 2011’ 
(2012) 49 CMLRev 349.
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reasoning in the context of the right to access to justice such as it exists in the 
Charter. As will be briefly demonstrated, it is still possible to have widely diverg-
ing opinions on the new developments in this area of eu law. This is evident 
for example, in the Opinion of the Advocate General who takes a different ap-
proach to the case, focusing more on the individual elements and their place in 
the constitutional framework of the Union and reaches different conclusions.
2 The Case
2.1 The Facts
The current lz case (the engo is formally called Lesoochranárske zoskupenie 
vlk which translates to the Forest Protection Association vlk; called lz for 
short in the judgment) concerns the Strážov Mountains, an area of which has 
been designated as a special protection area (spa) under the Birds Directive 
(Directive 79/409/eec) in 2004.17 Part of the mountain reservation was also in-
cluded on the list of sites of Community importance pursuant to the Habitats 
Directive.18 
Biely Postok a.s. is a company that breeds deer for, amongst other things, 
hunting purposes near the Strážov Mountains spa. On 18 November 2008, lz is 
notified by the district authority of Biely Postok’s request to be allowed to build 
an enclosure for these deer on parcels of land that are within the spa. After 
receiving further information, as per its request, lz asked for a stay of pro-
ceedings as observations offered by the Service for Natural Protected Areas,19 
indicated grounds for the denial of the request. In April 2009, lz was denied 
the status of ‘party to the proceeding’, triggering the complex constellation of 
events that would lead to the preliminary question under discussion.
The district authority in Trenčín would not grant lz the status of ‘party to 
the proceeding’ as the law in Slovakia accorded parties such as engos the sta-
tus of ‘interested person’.20 This was confirmed in the administrative appeal 
to this decision on the first of June 2009, and became final on the 10th of June 
that same year. On that same day, the permit for Biely Postok was accorded. 
The following day, lz brought an action against the district authority’s decision 
17 Then Directive 79/409/eec On the Conservation of Wild Birds, amended in 2009 to Direc-
tive 2009/147/ec.
18 Commission Decision 2008/218/ec oj L 77, 106 adopting a first updated list of sites of 
Community importance for the Alpine biogeographical region pursuant to Council Di-
rective 92/43/eec (oj L 206, 7).
19 Part of an governmental agency, similar to a park service.
20 Paragraph 82(3) Law No. 543/2002 on the protection of nature and the landscape.
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at the Regional Court in Trenčín. That court stayed the proceedings as the afore-
mentioned Case C-240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie was still pending. Upon 
pronouncement of that case, the Regional Court annulled the decisions of the 
district authority by judgment of 23 August 2011. However, this decision by the 
Regional Court was overturned and sent back by the Supreme Court of the 
Slovak Republic, in a large part due to the finality of the decision given by the 
district authority on 10 June. Within Slovak law, the Supreme Court also noted, 
there exists a procedure for an applicant to be granted the status of ‘omitted 
party’, but this procedure should be initiated within three years after the con-
tested decision has become final.21
The Regional Court annulled the decision of 10 June 2009 again, this time on 
the ground that the district authority had acted prematurely in taking its deci-
sion, as the legal proceedings regarding the status of lz were still in motion at 
the time of the decision. Yet this decision by the Regional Court was again set 
aside by the Supreme Court by way of a judgment on 12 September 2012, based 
on the same reasoning it employed in its previous ruling. As the Regional Court 
undertook its third assessment of the case, it dismissed lz’s claim to be award-
ed the status of ‘party to the proceeding’ and stated that it was not obliged to 
notify the applicant of the possibility to be awarded an ‘omitted party’, as the 
three-year term of expiration had passed. Against this judgment of 23 Novem-
ber 2013, the engo appealed again before the Supreme Court, referencing its 
rights under the Aarhus Convention, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the eu (the Charter) and Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, in 
the light of the judgement in Case C-240/09. It is in this case that the Supreme 
Court decided to make a preliminary reference to the cjeu as it considers the 
permit system such as it exists under the Slovakian Civil Administration Code 
to potentially exclude the possibility for public participation in decisions that 
have an impact on the environment.
2.2 The Question
Given the particularities of the situation, the question posed by the referring 
court is complex due to the elements it seeks to incorporate:
Is it possible to guarantee the right to an effective remedy and to a fair tri-
al, affirmed in Article 47 of the Charter, in the event of a purported breach 
of the right to a high level of environmental protection established under 
the conditions laid down by the European Union, mainly by Directive 
92/43 (particularly [of the right] to help obtain the public’s opinion on a 
21 As part of the Slovak Civil Procedural Code, not the Administrative Procedural Code 
under Article 250b(2).
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project which could have a significant impact on special areas of conser-
vation falling within the European ecological ‘Natura 2000’ network), and 
the right invoked by the appellant (as a not-for-profit association active 
in the protection of the environment at national level) under Article 9 
of the Aarhus Convention, within the limits indicated by the Court of 
Justice in its judgment of 8 March 2011, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie (Case 
C-240/09, eu:C:2011:125), where the national court terminates the judicial 
review proceedings in a case concerning the review of a decision refusing 
to grant [that association] the status of party in an administrative pro-
cedure regarding the issuing of a permit, as has happened in the present 
case, and invites [that association] to lodge an appeal against its having 
been excluded from that administrative procedure?
The question can be divided into a number of elements. The Advocate Gen-
eral took a formalist approach and gives a thorough overview of each of the 
legal elements. As such, she addresses the Aarhus Convention, the rights un-
der Article 6 and Article 9 of that Convention, the Habitats Directive and the 
Charter as separate elements that she then applied to the complex situation 
described above. A more casuistic approach can also be taken, which in the 
opinion of the author is at least in part followed by the Court, by separating 
the issue of the right of participation of the engo in the permit procedure, and 
the subsequent possible denial of justice due to the procedural rules laid down 
in the Code of Administrative Procedure and the Code of Civil Procedure.
It is proposed that, given the depth of the analysis by the ag and the manner 
in which she ties this case to the significance of Case C-240/09, a brief overview 
of the Opinion is given before further analysis of the judgment takes place.
2.3 The ag
The Opinion of the ag is of interest due to the well structured and analytical 
manner in which she approaches the case. Where, as will be demonstrated, 
the Court takes a more straightforward approach, ag Kokott deconstructs 
the complex procedure down to its basic elements. As such, she offers a nine-
point analysis structured along the two main points of the case: the rights of an 
engo and access to justice. The Opinion offers a view of the national perspec-
tive. Kokott rebuts the claims of both Slovakia and Biely Potok that the subject 
matter of the case should be limited, given the finality of the initial proceed-
ings under Slovak law. The ag illustrates the state of unclarity of the proce-
dure that still existed at the time of the oral proceedings before the Court of 
Justice.22 The status of that initial procedure is the fulcrum on which the ag 
22 Opinion ag Kokott point 39.
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builds her case regarding the nature of Article 6(3) Habitats Directive and the 
rights on which lz should be able to rely.
This leads to one of the main substantive differences between the Court 
and the ag in their reasoning. When discussing the role of the Aarhus Conven-
tion in the current dispute, the ag relies on a complex framework in which 
the Convention can be used as a standard of review. Beginning with the as-
sertion that the Court has “unlimited jurisdiction to interpret Articles 6 and 
9(2) of the Convention”, due to the implementation of the Convention in the 
Habitats Directive, the ag is of opinion that Article 6(1)(b) is of direct effect 
due to the specific wording in the French authentic text of the Convention. 
This is especially interesting as the ag (and later the Court) acknowledges that 
the enclosure, which is the point of contention in the original dispute, is not 
mentioned as a project falling under the Annex i referred to by Article 6(1)(b) 
Aarhus Convention.23
The other substantive difference is the ag analysis of the interplay between 
the rights to a fair trial as laid down in Article 47 Charter, and the right to an 
effective remedy set out by Article 9(4) Aarhus Convention. The ag begins by 
stating that the responsibility for sufficient judicial protection lies primarily 
with the Member State. Given the absence of eu rules on this point, the ag fo-
cuses on the principle of effectiveness rather than on a substantive analysis of 
the Slovak procedural codes.24 Given that approach, it is therefore not remark-
able that the ag comes to the conclusion that, even though the procedure has 
a complicated nature, the system as envisaged by the Slovakian national pro-
cedural law, nor the three year time limit are necessarily precluded by Article 
47 Charter or Article 9(4) Aarhus Convention. As will be demonstrated below, 
it is on this point that the Court’s interpretation will be the most far reaching, 
thereby coming to a conclusion that is manifestly different from the ag’s care-
ful deliberation.
2.4 The Court of Justice
As mentioned, the Court of Justice take a more casuistic approach. To that end, 
it first sets out the requirements under the Habitats Directive in conjunction 
with the Aarhus Convention relating to the right of participation for engos, 
further discussed in section 2.4.1. Having established this framework, the Court 
than proceeds with an analysis of the procedural rules in the light of  Article 
9 (specifically paras. 2 and 4) Aarhus Convention and Article 47 Charter, fur-
ther discussed in section 2.4.2. The reasoning being that lz’s right to  access 
23 Ibid Points 64–68.
24 Ibid Point 97.
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to justice is a fundamental safeguard for the exercise of lz’s right to public 
participation.
2.4.1 The Right of Access to Participation
The Court starts by setting out the conditions under national law by which 
the rights laid down in the Habitats Directive can be effectuated. It comes 
to the conclusion that lz can only apply against a decision, such as the one in 
the current procedure, which potentially infringes upon Article 6(3) Habitats 
Directive, if it has the status of ‘party to the procedure’. The Court establishes 
that the idea behind the system set out in Article 6(3) of the Directive is to 
assure that plans or projects are initiated on the basis of the most accurate 
scientific knowledge available. Through this system it is believed that the high-
est level of environmental protection will be able to be achieved in line with 
the goals set out in Article 2(2) of the Directive. Although Article 6(3) does 
not create rights, the Court is of opinion that it would go against the binding 
effect of directives laid down in Article 288 tfeu, if it were not possible for in-
dividuals to rely on it, or were national courts not to take it into considerations 
in the assessment of the legality of a project such as the under discussion. 
It then follows that, in line with the Habitats Directive, the opinion of the 
general public should be asked, where appropriate. This is a direct imple-
mentation of the Aarhus Convention.25 The Court then sets out the manner 
in which Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention aims to implement the pillar of 
participation to decision making into the eu legal order. It is then possible to 
interpret Article 6 of the Habitats Directive in the light of the Aarhus Conven-
tion in order to assess the extent of lz’s rights and the obligations place on the 
local authorities.
Foregoing a discussion on the nature of lz, but automatically accepting its 
status as falling under the concept of ‘the public concerned’ within the mean-
ing of the Convention,26 the Court brings together the Aarhus Convention and 
the Habitats Directive. The enclosure is not one of the projects mentioned in 
Annex i to the Aarhus Convention, for which public involvement is systemati-
cally required. However, as the local authority initiated an authorisation pro-
cedure within the meaning of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, the proce-
dure falls under the system envisaged by tArticle 6(1)(b) Aarhus Convention. 
Although there is a considerable margin of appreciation for the Member State 
in the implementation of a system of participation, this only applies to the 
25 Case C-243/15 Paras. 43–45.
26 Article 2(5) Aarhus Convention.
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manner in which that right to participate in proceedings can be implemented, 
the right itself cannot be derogated from.27
2.5 The Right to Access to Justice
Having thus established that the right to participation and that the manner 
in which it has been implemented in the current case falls under eu law, the 
Court states that within this context the Member State is obliged to provide an 
effective remedy to protect this right under Articles 4(3) and 19 teu. Further-
more, in applying eu law within the meaning of Article 51(1) Charter, the Court 
finds the jurisdiction to apply Article 47 Charter.
The standard by which the Court assesses the right to a remedy as stated 
in Article 47 Charter is that of Article 9(2) Aarhus Convention. This provision, 
which is an integral part of eu law, applies in situations regarding the use of 
 Article 6(1)(b) Aarhus Convention, which has been affirmed to be implemented 
by Article 6(3) Habitats Directive. As the Convention aims to offer wide access 
to justice, organisations such as lz should be able to rely on the right laid down 
by Article 9(2) Aarhus Convention to defend the rights awarded to them by eu 
environmental law. This entails being able to not only to challenge the decision 
whether an assessment of the site should take place, but also to have defects 
remedied through judicial means when such an assessment been undertaken. 
To this end, the Aarhus Convention not only requires access to justice, but also 
for these procedures to be adequate and effective.28
The Court conceded that it is in principle for the referring court to assess 
whether the system as described in the question complies with the principles 
set out by eu law and the Aarhus Convention. Yet it asserted its authority to 
“[…]deduce from the provisions of eu law the criteria that the referring court 
may or must apply within the framework of eu law.”29 It thus sets out the 
requirements under Article 6(3) Habitats Directive, coming to a conclusion 
based on a “stringent authorisation criterion” which, together with the precau-
tionary principle helps to protect the spas.30 The Court finds that although lz 
was able to participate in the proceedings, it did not have the possibilities to 
protect the integrity of the spa it would have had, had it been awarded the sta-
tus of ‘party to the proceedings’ from the outset.31 Furthermore, the possibility 
27 Case C-243/15 Para. 48.
28 Case C-243/15 Paras. 59–62.
29 Ibid. Para. 64.
30 Ibid. Para. 66.
31 Ibid. Para. 67, the Court goes into greater detail regarding the specific possibilities of lz 
had it been awarded the status of ‘party to the proceedings’ in paragraph 69, making use 
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of the applicant for the permit to be the only party in the authorisation pro-
cess, as it is the only party to be automatically awarded the status of ‘party to 
the proceeding’, is deemed likely to be at odds with the goal of the system, to 
achieve a high level of environmental protection. Therefore, the interpretation 
of national law such as in the current procedure is not “designed to prevent 
specific adverse effects on the integrity of the site”.32 The question posed by the 
referring court is thus answered in the negative.
3 Explanation
The complex interplay that occurs between these three laws, the Habitats 
 Directive, the Charter, and the Aarhus Convention, is perhaps best illustrated 
by the effort of the ag to put each of these elements in its place. When reading 
each segment, the question posed by Jans rises again.33 To put that question 
slightly differently: Why should the Court of Justice be able to uphold the stan-
dard set by the Aarhus Convention? The question remains compelling, and yet 
it is the author’s assertion that the Strážov Mountains case offers an insight in 
what the Court is trying to build. It should be kept in mind that the reasoning 
of Court is rather far-reaching, as the essence of the question is in fact:
Is it unnecessarily burdensome for an engo to go through a secondary 
procedure, to achieve a status to contest the primary procedure in which 
it was unable to reach that goal due to procedural rules.34
The issue at hand is therefore subtly different from the Slovak Bear case. In 
that case, the possibility that lz could rely directly on the Aarhus Convention 
was at issue. Even though the eu had not successfully undertaken any steps to 
implement the Article 9(3) of the Convention in any way, shape or form, the 
Court considered that the effectiveness of the protection of the brown bear 
would be diminished if lz did not have the rights conferred upon them by 
the Convention. It considered itself competent to come to this conclusion, as 
the brown bear was placed on Annex iv(a), on protected species.35 Thus, the 
of the documents that it has received in relation to the administrative procedure before 
the local authority.
32 Ibid. Para. 72.
33 Jans (n 3).
34 Triggering the ag’s references to Kafka and Cervantes.
35 Case C-240/09 para. 37–38.
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proceedings fell under the auspices of eu law and that of the Court.  Looking at 
the general system and the eu’s intentions in relation to the implementation 
of the Convention, the Court stated that it had the jurisdiction to interpret 
Article 9(3) Aarhus Convention and whether the article had  direct  effect.36  
In that case as in the current one, the Court gave an extensive reading of what 
the right to access to justice should entail, one could argue, producing a similar 
effect to harmonising where the Commission had failed.
In the current case, there is room for additional nuance. The question be-
fore the Court primarily deals with the system of access to participation in the 
decision-making process. As both the ag and the Court make clear, this right, 
laid down in Article 6 Aarhus Convention, has been implemented by the eu 
in a number of pieces of legislation, some of which follow the wording of the 
Convention verbatim.37 Therefore, the traditional manner in which the Court 
of Justice asserts its authority over the interpretation of a clause in a mixed 
agreement on shared competences is not out of place. However, the manner in 
which the Court asserts that Article 6 Habitats Directive and its partner, Article 
6 Aarhus Convention, are applicable is again reminiscent of the Slovak Bear 
case. It should be remembered that the enclosure requested by Biely Potok 
a.s. does not fall under the list of projects mentioned in Annex i of the Aarhus 
Convention for which public participation is systematically required. It rather 
falls within the meaning of Article 6(1)(b) Aarhus Convention,38 which leaves a 
certain margin of appreciation for the signatories. It is therefore not necessar-
ily logical that the Court can claim interpretative authority on the status of Slo-
vakian procedural law under Article 6(1)(b) Aarhus Convention, given the pro-
cedural autonomy of the Member State. The manner in which the Court claims 
authority is clearly in the spirit of the Slovak Bear case. Member States have 
a certain margin of appreciation in establishing whether the Aarhus public 
participation framework applies as regards projects fall under Article 6(1)(b) 
Aarhus Convention. However, when the national authority chooses to make 
use of the system under Article 6(3) Habitats Directive, it is implementing eu 
36 Ibid. para. 45.
37 Case C-243/15 para. 58, where the Court gives the example of the eia Directive that has 
been amended to mirror the Aarhus Convention. (Directive 85/337/eec oj L175, 40 as 
amended by Directive 2003/35/ec oj L 156, 7).
38 “Shall, in accordance with its national law, also apply the provisions of this article to deci-
sions on proposed activities not listed in annex I which may have a significant effect on 
the environment. To this end, Parties shall determine whether such a proposed activity is 
subject to these provisions;”.
van Wolferen
journal for european environmental & planning law 14 (2017) 136-151
<UN>
148
law.39 This triggers the authority of the Court to interpret Article 6(1)(b) 
Aarhus Convention.
This implementation equally opens the door to the wide scope of review 
that the Court uses in determining whether the complicated system in the 
 Slovakian Administrative and Civil Procedural Codes infringes the principle 
of a fair trial under the Charter. It is not the first time that Article 47 Charter 
has been linked to Article 9 Aarhus Convention, as ag Kokott has used it in her 
Opinion in Edwards, where she linked the rights of the individual set out in 
 Article 47 Charter to the public interest.40 Interestingly, the Court does not en-
ter into such a debate on the nature of the Article, rather it immediately used 
the Aarhus Convention as a standard by which it can apply the right to a fair 
trial in this case. With the invocation of Article 47 Charter, the referring court 
may have, so to speak, dug the grave for its own procedural law. The wide scope 
of the Charter gives the Court the possibility to assess the effectiveness of the 
procedure through Aarhus tinted glasses, without having to go again into a dis-
cussion on the nature of Article 9(2) Aarhus Convention. This is of interest, as 
the Article 47 Charter is notoriously difficult to apply through judicial review, 
especially regarding standing requirements.41
The result is a judgment which heavily relies on the wording and intent be-
hind the Aarhus Convention, in particular that of Articles 9(2) and 9(4). This 
leads to an assessment of Slovakian procedural law by the Court of Justice in-
stead of a referral back to the Supreme Court, allowing the referring court to 
implement the Court’s finding in the national legal order. Although tailored 
to the, rather specific, circumstances of the case, this gives us an interestingly 
detailed list of conditions that the Court sees as essential in both the right 
of participation in decision-making as the right for access to justice. Case 
C-243/15 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie vlk v  Obvodný úrad Trenčín can be seen 
as a refinement of its predecessor, giving a taste of what is possible when three 
instruments of rights protection are used in harmony by the cjeu.
39 See C-243/15 para. 47.
40 Case C-260/11 Edwards and Pallikaropoulos v. Environmental Agency eu:C:2012:645.
41 Consider the limitations mentioned by Prechal. It becomes clear that the Charter is effec-
tive where the right is obviously hindered, yet there are difficulties in the enforcement of 
a normative standard. Sacha Prechal, ‘The Court of Justice and Effective Judicial Protec-
tion: What Has the Charter Changed?’ in Christophe Paulussen and others (eds), Funda-
mental Rights in International and European Law (tmc Asser Press 2016) 151 <http://link 
.springer.com/10.1007/978-94-6265-088-6_7> accessed 25 October 2016.
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4 Consequences
With the Aarhus Convention applied under the principle of effectiveness, 
especially Article 9 Aarhus Convention through the interplay with Article 47 
Charter, the Court has created an enforcement mechanism in the eu that 
is unknown in the Convention system, that makes use of the  non-judicial 
 Compliance Committee. The wide margin of appreciation regarding locus 
standi that has been traditionally awarded to Member States, even by the Con-
vention itself, seems to have shrunk by a significant margin. This is a result 
of the Court acting resolutely in line with the scope and goals stated by the 
Convention. The effectiveness test gains a set of teeth, as the procedural rights 
of the Convention as interpreted by the accc often gives stricture guidance 
on implementation, where eu secondary legislation often remains silent. This 
empowers environmental ngos to be an active partner in the enforcement of 
eu law, at a level that is unattainable for, for example, dgenv.42
Where in the Slovak Bear case, the Court seemed to take the approach that 
has been taken by ag Kokott in this case, it is clear that it now no longer sees 
the need for a meticulous discussion on the specific place of the Convention 
in the eu constitutional order. Nor does the Court enter into discussion on the 
relationship between this mixed agreement and its jurisdiction. The Aarhus 
Convention is an integral part of the acquis. As such the Court can interpret its 
effect in the European legal order. The effectiveness of the protection of the eu 
goal of a high level of environmental protection restricts severely the margin of 
interpretation for the (referring) courts as regards the standards that flow from 
the wording and scope of the Convention.
Critics will note how this seemingly collides with the Court’s own rigid 
stance on the protection of the environment through direct access to judicial 
review for public interest litigants, such as lz. However, here the complete sys-
tem of remedies comes into view.43 The Aarhus Convention, due to the nature 
of eu law and the place that international law takes in that system, can only 
affect the interpretation of secondary law. When it comes to the Treaty, which 
set out the system for judicial review of Union acts in Article 263 tfeu, the 
42 Although it is possible for the Commission to enforce problems with participation in en-
vironmental decisions under the Habitats Directive under the 258 tfeu procedure, the 
sheer amount of information needed to find these infringements is unworkable. See in 
this journal: Ludwig Krämer, ‘The Commission’s Omission to Use Article 267 tfeu as a 
Tool to Enforce eu Environmental Law’ (2016) 13 jeepl 255.
43 Case 284/83 Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v European Parliament eu:C:1986:166 para. 23.
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Court is severely limited in the extension of its scope.44 Similarly, the effects of 
the Charter are explicitly curtailed by the Explanations.45
Yet, the Court uses these tools to great effect on a Member State level. By 
treating the Aarhus Convention as an integral part of European law, and link-
ing it to the obligation of the Member States for sincere cooperation under 
Article 4(2) teu and their obligation to ensure the judicial protection of Euro-
pean rights under Article 19 teu, the Court is decentralising the complete sys-
tem of remedies regarding European environmental law. Slovak Bears, may at 
first glance seem as a leap in reasoning regarding the possibility for the Court 
of Justice to interpret international law on which no eu measures have taken 
place, but it is logical from the perspective of protection of an endangered spe-
cies explicitly mentioned in the Habitats Directive. Likewise, the protection of 
the right to participate in the decision-making procedure not covered by either 
the Aarhus Convention or explicitly by the Habitats Directive may seem far 
reaching. Yet, as rightly remarked by the Court, it does justice to the spirit and 
wording of the  Convention (and consequently the Directive) to whose com-
pliance the Union is dedicated. By adding the element of Article 47 Charter 
in the Strážov Mountains case, the Court perhaps now sees a chance to add 
substantive requirements to an area of procedural autonomy where it has been 
traditionally hard to gain traction, standing requirements.
It is argued that the strict enforcement by the Court of Justice of the guaran-
tees envisioned by the Aarhus Convention as regards access to justice vis-à-vis 
national procedural law contributes to the creation of a complete system of 
remedies, as it has always promised.46 The existence of a complete system of 
remedies has always had difficulty to convince public interest litigants.47 The 
direct access to the Court has been proven to be almost inaccessible, and the 
practice concerning national courts use of Article 267 tfeu does not seem 
to balance that inaccessibility.48 Although this may do justice to the concept 
44 Matthijs van Wolferen, ‘The Limits to the cjeu’s Interpretation of Locus Standi, a Theo-
retical Framework’ (2016) 12 Journal of Contemporary European Research <http://jcer 
.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/782> accessed 5 January 2017.
45 Art. 52 para. 2 Charter and the corresponding text in the Explanations: ‘[…] such rights 
remain subject to the conditions and limits applicable to the Union law on which they are 
based, and for which provision is made in the Treaties’.
46 Case 284/83 Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v European Parliament eu:C:1986:166 para. 23.
47 Roland Schwensfeier, ‘Individual’s Access to Justice under Community Law’ (Diss, Univer-
sity of Groningen 2009).
48 Veerle Heyvaert, Justine Thornton and Richard Drabble, ‘With Reference to the Environ-
ment: The Preliminary Reference, Procedure, Environmental Decisions and the Domestic 
Judiciary’ [2014] The Law Quarterly Review 413.
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of procedural autonomy, it detracts from the sense of an integrated European 
legal order, with a complementary integrated judicial order. The Commission, 
following indications from the Court, argued the existence of a functional 
tiered judicial system, where issues of eu law are in fact a matter of imple-
mentation at a national level. Therefore, national courts should be the starting 
point for the review procedure in the complete system of remedies. Cases such 
a C-240/09 and now C-243/15 are in fact the first indication that the Court is 
pursuing such a tiered system rather than only arguing it. Placed in the argu-
ments put forward at the time of the accc proceedings against the European 
Union,49 it can be argued that the Court sees easier access to justice on a Mem-
ber State level as a possible point of access to the Court of Justice. A line of 
reasoning that may be supported by the help in that respect from its cousine 
in Strasbourg, which recently found the failure to refer a case to the cjeu in 
certain situations to be a breach of Article 6 echr.50 Therefore, the Strážov 
Mountains case may superficially seem to be a logical extension of the cjeu 
previous case-law in the Slovak Bears case, where it sees itself as the referee on 
Aarhus Convention related matters. The reasoning of the Court in the present 
case seems to indicate that this station has been passed, and it is now making 
full use of the Convention to effectuate greater access to justice in the member 
states for engos. In effect, this signifies the Court’s further move towards a 
truly integrated, tiered judicial system. This could be a first step, but it should 
be kept in mind that this development will only have an effect is the all other 
elements in the system are aligned accordingly. Most importantly, the condi-
tions that control national courts possibilities to make a reference, or indeed 
the conditions under which they are able to derogate from this obligation are 
do not seem capable to guarantee judicial protection.51 Under these circum-
stances, the Strážov Mountains case can be an interesting first step, yet if this 
is the road down which the Court wishes to travel, a lot of roadwork will need 
to be done.
49 See Case accc/C/2008/32 European Union, communication from the Party concerned 
dd. 11.06.2009.
50 Schipani and Others v. Italy no. 38369/09 Chamber Judgment, [2015] echr 735.
51 On the difficulties for redressing shortcomings in judicial protection at national level 
in the context of environmental plans and programmes, see: Squintani L and Plambeck 
E.J.H, ‘Judicial Protection against Plans and Programmes Affecting the Environment: 
A Backdoor Solution to Get an Answer from Luxembourg’ (2016) 13 J. Eur. Environ. Plann. 
Law Journal for European Environmental and Planning Law 294 On the Commission’s 
failure to make effective use of this procedure, see Kramer (n. 42). On national courts 
reluctance in making use of Article 267 tfeu see Heyvaert, Thornton and Drabble (n. 48).
